DISINFO: The EU is interfering in Bulgaria’s election through its censorship tools
SUMMARY
In Bulgaria, the EU opened a new front in its election war with a familiar playbook. Brussels’ censorship tools are being used to squash a rising anti-establishment political force. Its ‘Rapid Response System’ (RRS) empowers EU-approved ‘fact-checkers’ to flag online content as ‘disinformation’ and request its removal from social media platforms such as TikTok and Meta. Platforms that refuse to comply are liable to fines under the EU’s Digital Services Act (DSA), which came into force in 2022. The EU is outsourcing its dirty work – again. Working hand in hand with the Bulgarian government, the EU is paying researchers to justify the use of its own censorship tools, in order to stifle legitimate political speech that harms its broader geopolitical agenda.
RESPONSE
The claim has been identified as part of a wider pro-Kremlin disinformation campaign accusing the EU of interference in multiple electoral processes.
The Bulgarian government has asked the EU for help against Russia’s own interference in the election scheduled for 19 April 2026, which is very different from meddling to favour one candidate over another, which is what Russia does. Neither these mechanisms to fight online content manipulation nor the Digital Services Act are “tools for censorship”. The Digital Services Act aims to regulate online spaces in order to make them safe and trustworthy for users, mandating social media and internet platforms to do more to tackle the spread of illegal content and other societal risks on their services in the EU – or else risk fines for non-compliance.
Russia’s tactics to influence the election results in Bulgaria include suspected attempts of vote-buying, several thousand manipulative articles published by the Pravda network and Telegram channels every month, and multiple disinformation narratives aimed to undermine trust in the electoral system and demobilize voters. Mirroring allegations whenever there is negative reporting on Russia’s actions, as in this case, is a recurring-pro Kremlin disinformation technique.
See other examples of similar disinformation narratives, such as claims that the EU was plotting regime change in Hungary, that Brussels is preparing colour revolutions in Serbia, Hungary and Bosnia and Herzegovina, that Brussels cracks down on pro-Trump European leaders, that the EU is interfering in Armenia's internal affairs, or that European countries that disagree with Brussels run the risk of colour revolutions.